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I. INTRODUCTION
Motivation and the effective utilization of people in
organized human effort are subjects which continually remain
high on the list of managerial interests. All men have pur-
poses, and these purposes affect the way they work. Under-
standing these purposes and finding ways to allow the
organization and the worker to achieve their respective
goals simultaneously is the issue. Since the 1920 's there
has been an endless stream of literature on the subject. It
is an important subject since motivation is a key to produc-
tivity and productivity can make or break an organization,
whether in the public or private domain. Of course, pro-
ductivity is a function of more than motivation, being in-
fluenced by individual skills and abilities, but motivation
is certainly an important factor.
The theories and concepts of motivation have become con-
siderably more sophisticated than the early principle of
hedonism where the central assumption was that behavior was
directed toward pleasure and away from pain, but there is
still considerable diversity in methods and implementation.
For this paper a generalized approach will be taken, looking
at several theories and their associated assumptions about
the nature of man, and what motivates man in the workplace.
These theories will then be related to the use of money as a

motivational device, with particular interest toward pay-
for-performance, or merit pay programs. The latter are of
primary interest because the Civil Service Reform Act of
1978 required the introduction of a merit pay system for
high grade management and supervisor personnel in the Fed-
eral workforce. The objective of this paper is to relate
money to motivation and to assess the value of pay-for-
performance as a stimulus to increased productivity. Al-
though a number of motivational theories and ideas will be
discussed, the central aim of the paper will be an analysis
of the motivational value of a portion of the Civil Service
Reform Act known as the Merit Pay System.
A. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
Although the Civil Service Reform Act mandated the in-
troduction of the Merit Pay System throughout the Federal
sector, this paper will be restricted to the system as im-
plemented by the Department of the Navy. This system is
basically a management by objectives program with money of-
fered as a reward for successful objective achievement. The
paper will attempt to relate the use of money motivation,
through merit pay programs, to changes in employee satisfac-
tion and productivity, as predicted by the literature. The
analysis will be augmented by the discussion of the results
of survey data taken from a number of Department: of Navy
civilian employees covered by the Merit Pay Program.

B. BACKGROUND: THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORfl ACT OF 1978
The product of candidate Jimmy Carter's campaign pledge
to improve the efficiency of the Federal government was the
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. The act had administra-
tive as well as legal impacts, eliminating the Civil Service
Commission and replacing it with three new agencies, the
Office of Personnel Management, the Merit Pay Protection
Board, and the Federal Labor Relations Authority. Two major
objectives of the act were: "to provide the people of the
United States with a competent, honest, and productive work-
force reflective of the Nation's diversity, and to improve
the quality of public service. Federal personnel management
shall be implemented consistant with merit system principles
and free from prohibited personnel practices" and "in appro-
priate instances, pay increases shall be based on quality
performance rather than length of service" [Ref . 1] . The
Act provides for the establishment of a Performance Appraisal
System which encourages employee participation in establish-
ing performance standards and for the use of "results of
performance appraisals as a basis for training, rewarding,
reassigning, promoting, reducing in grade, retraining, and
retaining employees" [Ref. 2].
Prior to enactment, the general schedule (GS) of the
Federal workforce consisted of eighteen pay grades each
having ten steps, or pay levels, within each grade. Em-
ployees in a grade could advance through the steps based

upon length of service and acceptable performance (denial
of a step increase was a very rare occurrence) . Additional
step advances in the form of Quality Step Increases could
be paid to outstanding employees. The Act established the
Senior Executive Service for GS-16, 11, and 18 general
schedule and Level IV and V executive schedule employees to
"ensure that the executive management of the government of
the United States is responsive to the needs, policies, and
goals of the Nation and otherwise of the highest quality"
[Ref. 3]. Additionally it provided for a compensation sys-
tem designed to attract and retain highly competent senior
executives. The Senior Executive Service employees are
under a bonus-oriented system, with set salary levels and
lump-sum awards of up to 20 percent of one's salary.
With the top grades moved to the Senior Executive Ser-
vice, the number of grades in the general schedule was re-
duced to fifteen with the same ten-step structure. For
supervisory or management officials in GS-13, 14, and 15
positions, the Act established the Merit Pay System. The
stated purposes of this system are [Ref. 4]
:
1. Within available funds, recognize and reward quality
performance by varying merit pay adjustments.






provide for training to im-




4. Regulate the costs of merit pay by establishing appro-
priate control techniques.
For employees covered by the system, the method of com-
putation of the annual pay increase was modified to allow
merit pay adjustments based in part on the employee's per-
formance appraisal. The step structure is eliminated and a
pool formed to fund these merit pay increases with money
from three sources: the funds normally paid through step
increases, funds normally paid for Quality Step Increases
(the amount being based on statistical data) , and one-half
of the annual comparability pay increase, the annual com-
parability increase being similar to a cost-of-living in-
crease granted in the private sector. A somewhat complicated
formula incorporating both level of performance and pay grade
is used to divide this pool of money into individual pay
increases. In addition to these merit increases, the Act
allows for the payment of cash bonuses to employees who are
at the top of their pay range. For Merit Pay System employ-
ees, total annual pay increases are now based on two factors:
a minimum of one-half of the general schedule comparability
increase, and the merit increase based on the employee's
share of the pool.
This brief overview of the Act as it applies to pay ad-
ministration changes was presented to give some background
and establish some terms to be used later.
11

C. THE PLAN OF THE PAPER
The paper will start with a look at the beginnings of
management theory to give a framework for later management
thought. This will be followed by a discussion of the three
major approaches to motivation and their assumptions about
the nature of man at work. Contrasts will be drawn between
these approaches, and their value in a pragmatic management
philosophy will be discussed. Next, discussions of the
value of money as a motivator and merit pay programs and
their value as a motivational device will be offered. A
critique of the value of merit pay systems in the Federal
environment and a discussion of the survey data will follow.
Finally, conclusions as to the value of the Navy's Merit Pay
System will be presented.
12

II. THE BEGINNINGS OF MANAGEMENT THEORY
Since earliest history, when two or more individuals
have engaged in some productive effort, there has always
been a tendency for a leader, either formal or informal, to
emerge. As work units became large, the function of the
leader became more important, and organizational structures
were developed to attempt to manage workers in an efficient
way. Few early management efforts were founded in theory
and principle, relying instead on fear and heavy-handed
force to achieve management's goals. There were of course
exceptions; one of the earliest records of incentives being
offered for extra productivity is that of Nebuchadnezzar in
604 B.C. where extra food was allotted to individuals who
made special accomplishment in spinning and weaving [Ref.
5]. To gain a better perspective on the discussion of moti-
vation to follow, a short review of the beginnings of manage-
ment theory will be offered. It is by no means comprehensive,
but does offer a flavor of the awakenings and progress of
early management thought, beginning with classical ideas.
A. CLASSICAL J^ANAGEMENT THEORISTS
The industrial revolution brought the first systematic
experiments with softer managemenr approaches. These first
experiments were aimed at extrinsic motivation. They were
13

few in number and did little to start a general movement,
since labor was still plentiful and wages were so low as to
offer little concern to the factory owners.
In 1800, James Watt and Matthew Boulton were unique in
their management of the Soho Foundry. They paid incentive
wages based on a price-rate system, established an insurance
society for their workers, and were the first to recognize
the effects of a clean environment on productivity [Ref. 6].
As one of the forerunners of scientific management,
Robert Owen recognized the value of the human factor in
several cotton mills he managed at New Lanach, Scotland in
1810. Owen saw management's role as one of reform. He re-
duced the length of the standard work day and refused to
hire childlabor under age ten. During this period child
workers of 5 or 6 years were common. He built housing for
his workers and operated a company store where goods could
be purchased at fair prices. Ov/en was paternalistic in his
views and labor practices. He felt that improved working
conditions would inevitably lead to increased productivity
and profits, preaching that money spent on employees could
have a much higher return than that spent on machinery [Ref.
7]. In the mid-1800's Henry R. Towne, president of Yale and
Towne, designed a profit sharing plan to dispense profits
above a specific level as an addition to employee wages. At
the time of its introduction it was a revolutionary idea.
14

Charles Babbage contributed to these early efforts
through his study of factory operations and his advocacy of
the division of labor principle. His contributions were not
directly related to worker motivation, but toward increased
worker efficiency through skills improvement [Ref. 8].
A shortage of labor at the beginning of the twentieth
century fostered increased interest in scientific management
to meet the need for increased productivity. During this
period Fredrick Taylor published two books, Shop Management
and The Principles of Scientific Management and earned him-
self the title of "Father of Scientific Management" [Ref.
9] . He introduced management principles and wage incentive
plans designed to both assist and encourage workers to pro-
duce beyond their nominal potential. He emphasized work
methods improvement and economic rewards for better than
average performance. He defined management as "a true
science, resting upon clearly defined bases, rules, and prin-
ciples as a foundation" [Ref. 10] . Taylor merged his years
of experience as both worker and manager into a philosophy
which advocated the development of a true science of manage-
ment, the scientific selection of workers, the scientific
education and development of the worker, and intimate,
friendly cooperation between management and labor [Ref. 11].
Taylor had to contend with opposition from both workers
and unions who feared that if they worked too fast and in-
creased efficiency too much, some of their jobs would be
15

eliminated. His methods did dramatically increase produc-
tivity and led to higher pay in many instances, but the
resistance continued. In 1912, resistance to his methods
and principles caused a strike at the Watertown Arsenal in
Massachusetts. Because of the strike he was called to Con-
gress to explain his ideas and techniques. He testified
that in order for his philosophy to succeed management as
well as labor thought needed a "complete mental revolution."
He went on to call for a stop to the quarrelling over pro-
fits and a combined effort to increase productivity. He
felt that if this were accomplished, profits would increase
to such an extent that labor and management would no longer
have to compete for them [Ref. 12].
Another contributor to classical m.anagement theory was
Henry L. Gantt, a collaborator with Taylor, who modified
Taylor's differential price system by giving each worker a
fixed bonus for meeting the daily work standard. A further
modification included a bonus for the foreman for each
worker who met the standard, thus motivating both the em-
ployee to work harder and the foreman to insure his workers
were trained in efficient methods.
Also included are the Gilbreths, Frank and Lillian.
Their primary contributions were in the areas of worker
fatigue and motion studies. By determining the most eco-
nomical motions for each task, they were able to increase
performance and reduce fatigue. In addition, they developed
16

a three-position plan of promotion wherein a worker was
simultaneously training his successor, doing his present
job, and preparing for the next higher one. Thus a worker
could constantly look forward to promotion and avoid dead
end jobs [Ref . 13]
.
And finally, Henri Fayol must be acknowledged as the
founder of the classical management school, being the first
to systemize managerial behavior. A Frenchman, he spent his
career in the French coal and iron mining industries. His
insistance that management was not a personal talent, but a
skill to be learned like any other was a major contribution
to management thought.
The classical theorists began the movement toward manage-
ment as a science, but they dealt almost exclusively with
the external conditions of the work environment. It was
left to the human relations theorists to continue in the
spirit of Robert Owen and make an effort to utilize the
human element to its full extent.
B. THE HUMAN RELATIONS SCHOOL
Social scientists began working in the management area
in an attempt to fill the gap left by classical theorists in
the achievement of production efficiency and workplace har-
mony. The classical approach relied on rational patterns of
behavior, and when workers did not act predictably, it
failed. These social scientists attempted to lock at the
17

human side of organizations and align the worker's personal
goals with those of the organization. The movement was away
from the view that workers were all cast in McGregor's [Ref.
14] Theory X mold, and toward a view that acknowledged the
worker's complex sociological and psychological needs. Hugo
Munsterberg was the first to advance the interaction between
psychology and industry. He saw psychologists in industry
as helping productivity in three ways [Ref. 15]:
1. By identifying and matching the worker with the best
mental qualifications for a specific job.
2. By creating the best psychological work conditions.
3. Through the use of psychological influences to moti-
vate workers.
Munsterberg' s work had little impact at the time, but he set
the stage for the findings of the experiments being con-
ducted at the Hawthorne Works of Western Electric in Chicago.
The Hawthorne Experiments were carried out by Elton Mayo
and his associates from 1927 to 1932. The experiment
started with an investigation of the relationship between
work-area lighting and productivity. Mayo v/as called in
when the original researchers discovered what they considered
to be rather peculiar results, namely that productivity in-
creased whether the work area light level was increased or
decreased . Mayo perceived that "the human reactions of
people engaged in productive work have a much more important
effect on their morale and efficiency than had previously
been realized" [Ref. 16]. Experimenting with a test and a
13

control group, Mayo discovered that it v/as the special at-
tention paid to the groups that increased productivity
rather than the change in working conditions. The phenomenon
became known as the Hawthorne effect. The researchers de-
termined that informal work groups have a great influence
on productivity. The social environment of these groups
transmitted significant meaning to the employees' lives, and
group pressure had a stronger influence than management's
demands on productivity. He concluded that if management
can turn these socially satisfying informal groups into
positive, productive forces by providing employees with a
sense of being appreciated, they could maximize productivity
[Ref. 17].
Mayo ' s pioneering work was the first to view the social
environment as being influential in determining the quality
and quantity of work produced. The work also pointed to the
importance of management style and the need for people-
management skills in an effective organization.
C . SUMI4ARY
The classical theorists and the human relations school
laid the groundwork for a movement to the behavioral science
approach to be discussed in the next chapter. As will be
seen, the classical theories evolved into an approach known
as the "rational-economic man" and the human relations school
evolved into the "social man" approach. Neither school
19

completely described the individual in the workplace, but
were the beginners, and provided a stable foundation for
the later work of men like Argyris, Maslow, and McGregor.
20

III. MOTIVATION IN THE WORKPLACE
There is no single theory or strategy that will keep
morale and productivity high for all workers [Ref. 18]; with
this in mind, several approaches to motivation will be pre-
sented. As was discussed in the previous chapter, the clas-
sical theorists relied on wage incentives, offering extra
pay for increased productivity. They were effective to a
point, but as efficiency increased, fewer workers were needed
and lay-offs resulted. The reaction was to slow down the
work pace to insure job security. The human relations theo-
rists stressed psychology and the social aspects of the
workplace. Under both theories, workers were expected to
accept management's goals and authority because they were
offered either money or consideration and attention. This
chapter will look at contemporary thinking about motivation
and the ways in which these early theories have been modi-
fied and refined. Three approaches to motivation will be
discussed beginning with the rational-economic man.
A. THE RATIONAL-ECONOMIC MAN
This approach is in the same vein with classical think-
ing. Employees are expected to do no more than the organi-
zational control system encourages through the use of
incentives. An abnormal employee wanting to do more is soon
21

conditioned to fit the pattern through lack of additional
incentive. Schein [Ref. 19] lists several assumptions about
the nature of man in this approach. These assumptions are:
1. Man at work is primarily motivated by economic
incentives
.
2. Since economic incentives are under the control of the
organization, man is therefore a passive agent to be
manipulated, motivated, and controlled by the
organization.
3. Man's feelings are essentially irrational and must be
prevented from interfering with his rational calcula-
tions of self-interest.
4. Organizations can and must be designed in such a way
as to neutralize and control man's feelings and there-
fore his unpredictable traits.
Thus, an organization faced with low morale and/or low pro-
ductivity, could take one of the following actions [Ref. 20]:
1. Improve overall effectiveness by redesigning job and
organizational relationships.
2. Re-examine its motivation and rewards incentives plan.
3. Re-examine its control structure to determine if super-
visors are putting enough pressure on workers to pro-
duce, or if the system is adequate for identifying and
punishing slackards on the job.
^-Then a manager assumes that he can deal with his employ-
ees with the rational-economic approach, he has embraced the
ideas associated with McGregor's Theory X [Ref. 21]. These
ideas can be stated as follows:
1. The average human being has an inherent dislike of work
and will avoid it if he can.
2. Because of the human characteristic of dislike of work,
most people must be coerced, controlled, directed,
threatened with punishment to get them to put forth
22

adequate effort toward the achievement of organiza-
tional goals.
3. The average human being prefers to be directed, wishes
to avoid responsibility, has little ambition, wants
security above all.
The approach implies that man is "controlled" into
working through the use of economic incentives . The em-
ployer is buying the services and obedience of the employee
for economic rewards. Monetary incentives are one of the
pillars of the rational-economic man approach. Under these
assumptions, managerial strategy lies in efficient task per-
formance where the four principle functions a manager must
perform are to plan, organize, motivate, and control [Ref.
22] .
Organizations which use this approach are bureaucratic
in nature, based on a hierarchical structure with emphasis
on legalized, formal authority. Max Weber [Ref. 23] viewed
bureaucratic organizations as an apparatus of abstract de-
personalization, capable of attaining the highest degree of
efficiency, and the most rational known means of carrying
out imperative control over human beings. The approach uses
a strong system of authority and controls. Authority rests
essentially in designated offices or positions, and employees
are expected to obey whoever occupies the position of au-
thority. The burden for organizational performance falls
entirely on management and its use of monetary incentives.
23

Most examples of the rational-economic man assumptions
in action would be in the concept of an assembly line or
piece-rate production activities. Money and individual in-
centives have proven to be successful motivators of human
effort in these kinds of organizations. One problem which
should be anticipated is that if money is the only thing the
workers can expect from an organization, they will want more
of it. Since it is the only issue with which they can bar-
gain, they will likely form a union to use it effectively.
Lawless [Ref. 24] observes that at worst, the theory views
the individual as untrustworthy, money-motivated, and cal-
culating, except for those self starters who should manage
the former. At best, the theory makes the worker a rather
dull clod not knowing how to do things in his own interest
without some direction and incentive, primarily monetary.
Argyris [Ref. 25] observes that this theory will produce and
reward apathy, indifference, alienation, and non-involvement.
As industrial psychologists entered the picture and began
to study motivators, it became clear that workers had needs
and motives that did not fit the rational-economic model.
These studies led to the next model for consideration, the
social man.
3. THE SOCIAL MAN
It was the work of Elton Mayo during the Hawthorne
studies that disclosed the existance of a motivational
24

approach which differed from incentive motivation. He and
his colleagues found a strong need for social involvement
and a resistance to being put in a competitive position with
other workers. Mayo listed four assumptions regarding the
social needs of man relative to motivation [Ref. 26]:
1. Man is basically motivated by social needs and obtains
his basic sense of identity through relationships with
others.
2. As a result of the industrial revolution and the ra-
tionalization of work, meaning has gone out of work
itself and must therefore be sought in the social re-
lationships on the job.
3. Man is more responsive to the social forces of the
peer group than to the incentives and controls of
management.
4. Man is responsive to managem.ent to the extent that a
supervisor can meet a subordinate's social needs and
his needs for acceptance.
Management under these assumptions acknowledges the so-
cial and human needs in the job, opening the door to a psy-
chological contract between the employee and the organization,
in which each can expect much more of the other [Ref. 27],
A later study conducted by other Harvard researchers
[Ref. 28] found that Mayo ' s assumptions were valid. This
study found:
1. Worker productivity and job satisfaction were related
to their membership in the work group and not to the
pay and job status which the individual received.
2. Those workers who were regular members of a work group
tended to be satisfied and to conform to group norms
of productivity and to management's expectations.
3. Workers who isolated themselves from a work group
tended to be less satisfied and to violate group norms.
25

4. Deviates and isolates who aspired to group membership
and who identified with the group tended to produce
belov; the group's norms.
5. Deviates and isolates who did not aspire to group
membership tended to produce above the group ' s norms
.
Thus the existence of informal groups and the formation
of a social environment is viewed as an important factor in
worker satisfaction and productivity. Roethlisberger [Ref.
29] writing alone observes that a worker is not an isolated,
atomic individual, but rather is a member of a group or
several groups. He adds that these groups have their own
informal codes of behavior and their own sentiments through
which the behavior of their members is regulated and con-
trolled. The informal groups are important in an organiza-
tion and are manifestations of a healthy work environment.
Without them the organization is too sterile, and employees
are deprived of the feeling of security and belonging that
adds significance to their lives. Roethlisberger [Ref. 30]
cites the important need for tangible evidence of an indi-
vidual's social importance; the need to have a skill that is
socially recognized as useful, and the feeling of security
that comes not so much from the amount of money we have in
the bank as from being an accepted member of a group. He
likens a man whose job is without social function, as a man
without a country. The activity to which he has given the
major portion of his life is robbed of all human meaning.
26

In many ways the values and codes of conduct of the in-
formal group have as much or more influence than those of
the formal organization. Members of these groups are
evaluated by their peers just as formal evaluations are per-
formed by the organization, and these group evaluations may
have more to do v/ith job motivation than the former. The
sentiments underlying the evaluations made by the informal
organization are often very powerful determinants of human
behavior. The result may be that a worker feels worse to
be judged a "rate buster" by his fellow workers than to be
judged a "poor worker" by his supervisor. And he may behave
accordingly [Ref . 31]
.
The strength of the informal groups within any organiza-
tion is dependent to a large degree on the type of super-
vision exercised. Rensis Likert separates supervisors into
two types: those who are employee-centered and those who
are production or job-centered [Ref 32] . The employee-
centered supervisor, as the title indicates, is more con-
cerned about his subordinates than about their level of
production. This is not to say that he does not view pro-
duction as important, only that his method of attaining it
is different. Ke concentrates his attention on the human
aspects of his subordinates' problems and attempts to work
with them and to build them into a smooth-functioning team.
The job-centerad supervisor tends to consider his subordi-
nates as being Theory X type individuals who have to be told

exactly what to do and when to do it. He manages to pro-
duction levels and pushes his workers through an impersonal
routine designed to give high productivity and pays little
or no attention to the social atmosphere of the organiza-
tion. By not recognizing the social needs of his employees,
the job-centered supervisor is headed for trouble according
to Argyris [Ref . 33] . He observes that when the social
needs of employees are stifled by the formal organization,
the informal organization becomes stronger. Denied legiti-
macy, the informal group takes on new importance, and it can
easily and effectively restrict production.
If management wants to insure that it is satisfying the
social needs of its employees, the following strategies
might be followed [Ref. 34]
:
1. A manager should not limit his attention to the task
to be performed, but should give more attention to the
needs of the people who are working for him.
2. Instead of being concerned with motivating and con-
trolling subordinates, the manager should be concerned
with their feelings, particularly their feelings in
regard to acceptance and sense of belonging and
identity.
3. The manager should accept work groups as a reality and
think about group incentives rather than individual
incentives.
4. The manager's role shifts from planning, organizing,
motivating, and controlling to one of acting as an
intermediary between the men and higher management,
listening and attempting to understand the needs and
feelings of his subordinates, and showing considera-
tion and sympathy for their needs and feelings. The
manager, instead of being the creator of work, the




There is strong evidence that the assumptions of the
social man are consistent with fact. In contrast to the
rational-economic assumptions, Whyte [Ref. 35] found that
among production workers the proportion who are primarily
motivated by monetary incentives is low. Perhaps as few as
10 percent of workers respond to an individual incentives
scheme and ignore group pressures to restrict output. This
is an indication of the strength of the informal group.
Seashore [Ref. 36] found that high cohesiveness was asso-
ciated with high production if the group members had a high
confidence in management and with low production if the
group members had low confidence in management. This again
shows the degree to which the social interactions of the
informal group can control a situation and points up the
fact that management needs to foster good relations with
them.
Whyte in another study [Ref. 37] showed that absenteeism,
job quitting, and customer service in the restaurant industry
are related to social and group factors; if the groups were
well knit, good relations and high quality work were present.
On the counter side. Lawless [Ref. 38] states that a
weakness in the psychological contract is that the worker is
permanently bound to a parent-child relationship with the
organization. The parent is benevolent, but the child never
reaches maturity. He goes on to argue that too much of the
social man approach reduces a worker's ability to stand on

his own two feet and may be the cause of the huge welfare
state and associated social attitudes of today.
With these successes and shortcomings in mind, the third
approach is presented.
C. THE SELF-ACTUAL IZING MAN
This view is based upon the work of a number of obser-
vers. Maslow, McGregor, Argyris, Herzberg, and others see
a serious problem in the fact that most jobs in modern or-
ganizations are so specialized that they do not permit the
worker to use his capabilities, nor enable him to see the
relationship between what he is doing and the total or-
ganization mission. Maslow views human motivation in terms
of a hierarchy of five needs which may be categorized as
follows [Ref . 39]
:
1. Physiological needs. (The need for air, water, food,
and sex)
2. Security needs. (The need for safety, order, and
security)
3. Social needs. (The need for love, affection, feelings
of belonging, and human contact)
4. Esteem needs. (The need for self-respect, self-esteem,
achievement, and respect from others)
5. Self-actualization need. (The need to grow, to feel
self-fulfilled, and to realize one's potential)
Maslow indicated that an individual will be motivated to ful-
fill the need that is most powerful for him at a given time.
Starting with the most basic, the physiological, each need
must be at least partially satisfied by the individual before
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he moves up the hierarchy to the next stage. Most present
day organizations fulfill the physiological and security
needs satisfactorily, leaving management to attend to the
upper level needs. The social needs are those already men-
tioned. The higher level needs can be fulfilled through a
process of participative management in which employees are
provided feedback, recognition, and involvement in goal
setting and decision making. Self-actualization may mani-
fest itself in a number of different ways. For some em-
ployees it may be producing high quality work such as a fine
piece of furniture, while for others it may be developing a
creative idea.
Schein [Ref. 40] adds several assumptions about the na-
ture of man which he sees as applying to this approach.
These are:
1. Man seeks to be mature on the job and is capable of
being so. This means the exercise of a certain amount
of autonomy and independence, the adoption of a long-
range time perspective, the development of special
capacities and skills, and greater flexibility in
adapting to circumstances.
2. Man is primarily self-motivated and self-controlled;
externally imposed incentives and controls are likely
to threaten the person and reduce him to a less mature
adjustment.
3. There is no inherent conflict between self-actualization
and more effective organizational performance. If
given a chance, man will voluntarily integrate his own
goals with those of the organization.
These assumptions are in line with the assumptions made
by McGregor [Ref. 41] when he proposed that a more realistic
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picture of man than Theory X could be drawn if the assump-
tions of Theory Y were used. Theory Y assumes the following:
1. The expenditure of physical and mental effort in work
is as natural as play or rest. The average human
being does not inherently dislike work. Depending
upon controllable conditions work may be a source of
satisfaction or a source of punishment.
2. External control and the threat of punishment are not
the only means for bringing about effort toward or-
ganizational objectives. Man will exercise self-
direction and self-control in the service of objectives
to which he is committed.
3. Commitment to objectives is a function of the rev/ards
associated with their achievement. The most signifi-
cant of such rewards, e.g., the satisfaction of ego
and self-actualization needs, can be direct products
of effort directed toward organizational objectives.
4. The average human being learns, under proper condi-
tions, not only to accept but to seek authority.
Avoidance of responsibility, lack of ambition, and
emphasis on security are generally consequences of
experience, not inherent human characteristics.
5. The capacity to exercise a relatively high degree of
imagination, ingenuity, and creativity in the solution
of organizational problems is widely, not narrowly,
distributed in the population.
5. Under the conditions of modern industrial life, the
intellectual potentialities of the average human being
are only partially utilized.
McGregor then, sees man as not being limited by human nature
but by the lack of ingenuity of the organization. Man will
expand to fill any requirement given the proper environment.
Fredrick Herzberg and his associates conducted attitude
studies which identified a number of factors which added to
or detracted from work satisfaction. The studies [Ref . 42]
involved two hundred engineers and accountants who were asked

to identify times they felt very good and very bad about
their jobs. Herzberg identified two sets of factors which
he called satisfiers and dissatisfiers . He classified the
satisfiers as motivating factors and the dissatisf iers as
"hygiene" factors. The satisfiers included achievement,
recognition, responsibility, and advancement indicating that
employees were motivated by higher order needs in agreement
with Maslow. The absence of these factors had little to do
with employee dissatisfaction. The dissatisfiers included
salary, working conditions, and company policy. The lack of
these factors caused employee dissatisfaction while their
presence did not mean job satisfaction. Herzberg saw the
satisfiers as related to job content and the rewards that
resulted directly from performance of work tasks. The dis-
satisfiers came from the individual's relationship to the
job context or environment. The conclusion to be drawn from
this is that man can be motivated to higher productivity by
the nature of the work and the feelings of achievement that
go with the performance of meaningful tasks, with no need for
other extrinsic incentives. Man may be motivated by simply
allowing him to use his skills and capacity in a natural way.
A manager attempting to motivate in this way is less con-
cerned about being considerate to employees and more about
how to make their work intrinsically more challenging and
meaningful. The issue is not whether the employee can ful-
fill his social needs, but rather if he can find in his work
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meaning which gives him a sense cf pride and self-esteem
[Ref. 43].
Evidence to support this concept can be found in the in-
genuity of workers to create fantastic gadgets to make their
work easier, or their involvement in complicated means de-
signed to foil, fool, and frustrate management. Argyris
studied various kinds of manufacturing operations and found
that if the job itself frustrated an employee by being too
limiting or meaningless, he will create meaning and chal-
lenge in outwitting management or in banding together with
others in groups [Ref. 44] . In many cases the activities
involved in injecting meaning into a job may require more
effort than the work itself.
There is some question as to whether self-actualization
can occur at all levels of the organization, a problem cited
with redundant, assembly type work. The answer seems to be
that if a worker cannot self-actualize on the job he may use
the job to earn enough money to do so off the job during
leisure hours. This is an indication that money can be of
use, even with the sophistication of self-actualization. As
Gellerman points out, money is only a symbol, meaning what-
ever people want it to mean, and therefore reflects the am-
biguity of focuses and emotional nature of man. It is only
when money becomes a credible vehicle for achieving security,
station, and the intangible goals that it can begin to sym-
bolize them. And it is only when money symbolizes these
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goals that it begins to acquire significant motivating
power [Ref . 45]
.
D. SUMMARY
In the first two approaches to motivation, the rational-
economic and social man assumptions, the emphasis is on ex-
trinsic means. The organization does something to arouse
motivation and the psychological contract involves the ex-
change of economic or social rewards for performance. In
the self-actualization approach, the means are intrinsic in
that the organization provides an opportunity for the em-
ployee's motivation to be harnessed to the organization's
goals. Here the contract involves the exchange of oppor-
tunities to allow satisfaction for accomplishment and the
use of one's capacities for high-quality performance and
creativity. Although each set of assumptions becomes more
sophisticated, all three tend to be generalized and simpli-
fied concepts of man. Man is more complex than any of them.
Additionally, man is highly variable; he has many motives
which are arranged in some sort of hierarchy of importance
and subject to change from time to time and situation to
situation. Man is capable of learning new motives which may
change these patterns of motivation and psychological con-
tract. The nature of the task, the abilities and experience
of the person on the job, and the nature of fellow workers
and others in the organization all interact to produce a
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certain pattern of work and feelings. The conclusion to be
drawn is that there is no one correct management strategy
that will work for all men at all times. The successful
manager must be a good diagnostician and must have an in-
quiring spirit. Each of the approaches will likely be cor-
rect for some situation, and the manager must remain
flexible, read the situation, and be ready to accept a
variety of interpersonal relationships, patterns of au-
thority, and psychological contracts.
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IV. MONEY, MOTIVATION, AND MERIT PAY
The previous chapter presented three approaches to mo-
tivation. This chapter will look at the value of money as
a motivator, paying particular attention to its use in pay-
for-performance, or merit pay programs. Stated simply, the
purpose of these programs is to reward good performance with
increased salary, and in theory thereby motivate the person
to continue or improve performance. As was pointed out in
the previous chapter, money may or may not be an effective
motivator, depending on a number of circumstances. It was
found to be somewhat useful in early motivation programs
such as Taylor's differential pay incentives plan. However,
Whyte found that as few as 10 percent of workers respond to
individual incentives and ignore informal group norms of be-
havior, when a strong social environment has developed.
Schein, in his assumptions concerning the self-actualizing
man, cautioned that externally imposed incentives can
threaten the person and cause him to be less mature. Thus,
the question requires further study before any motivational
value for money can be determined. First, the literature
concerning money motivation will be examined, followed by a
look at merit pay systems.
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A. MONEY AS A MOTIVATION
Money is probably the oldest and most commonly used in-
centive. It fits perfectly into classical management think-
ing and is a main pillar in the rational economic approach.
Economists stress the exchange concept of money; money is
valuable because it can be exchanged for goods and services
[Ref . 46] . This is essentially the same view as cited by
Gellerman earlier. In Maslow terms, money can completely
satisfy some needs, such as the need for security, and may
serve to fill the need for status, esteem and recognition
as well. Money can provide a measure of success that is
visible to all, wages being a common measure of success
across society. One drawback to the reliance on money as
the principle motivator is the loss of management control
and a tendency for the worker to compromise quality in order
to get the most money for the least effort [Ref. 47]
.
Several studies have looked at the value of money as a
motivator. Herzberg and his colleagues [Ref. 48] reported
that money was a "hygiene" factor and that wages were found
to be the most frequent source of dissatisfaction, but the
least frequent source of satisfaction, indicating a low value
as a motivator. Opshal and Dunnette [Ref. 49] disagree with
Herzberg on this point. Working with the same data they
found the argument that money acts only as a potential dis-
satisfier "mystifying" . Their analysis of the data showed
that in describing good job feelings salary was mentioned as
38

a major reason for this feeling 19 percent of the time. In
contrast, salary was mentioned as a major cause of unusally
bad job feeling only 13 percent of the time. In a later
study, Herzberg and his associates [Ref. 50] conducted a
survey of 16 studies and found that pay ranked sixth in im-
portance. A similar survey conducted by Lawler [Ref. 51]
looked at 49 studies and found that pay ranked third overall
and that in 14 of the studies, or approximately 28 percent,
pay ranked first. Still another study [Ref. 52] revealed
that out of 18 job related factors, salary was ranked
twelfth in importance by a sample which had a representation
of 60 percent management and professional workers. In a
comment on self-actualization and money, Allen Mode [Ref.
53] observes that it is not evident that today's professional
employees really consider self-esteem and self-actualization
as their major goals in going to work. He adds that indi-
vidual and group accomplishments can be self-fulfilling, but
knowing that a measurable monetary reward will also be re-
ceived is a significant motivation for most employees.
Evidence indicates that satisfaction is dependent on
relative rather than absolute wage levels. According to the
theory of equity advanced by Adams [Ref. 54], workers strive
to attain an equitable relationship between job inputs and
outcomes on their own jobs, and in equity with those of
their fellow workers. A worker who believes that he is
overpaid relative to others with the same inputs may try to
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reduce the feelings of inequity and tension by increasing
his inputs and his level of performance. Likewise, a worker
who believes that he is being underpaid relative to others
may reduce his inputs and level of performance. It should
be noted that it is a perceived inequity, which may or may
not be real, which causes this behavior. Adams argues that
the inequity reduction only applies if employees are paid
in accordance with the amount of time worked. If an em-
ployee, who believes he is overcompensated is paid on a
piece-work basis, an increase in his productivity will in-
crease the inequity. However, he may reduce the inequity by
increasing the quality of his work to compensate. Vroom
[Ref. 55] interprets these results as reflecting the fact
that workers strive to maximize the equity of their wages
and attempt to perform at a level which is most consistent
with their concept of relative wages and qualifications of
themselves and their co-workers.
The rational-economic assumptions would indicate that
workers should attempt to maximize their economic return.
This should be true where wages are directly related to the
level of performance as in wage incentive plans. Viteles
[Ref. 56] reviewed survey information from companies with
wage incentive plans and found productivity did substantially
increase following their installation. Vroom [Ref. 57]
agrees with this observation. He cites a large number of in-
vestigations indicating that level of performance increases
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as the expected relationship between performance and wages
increases. He states that the positive value of money as a
motivator is also supported by the finding that this effect
is greatest for workers who responded that money is rela-
tively important to them and that the effect is dependent
not only on the amount of money involved, but on the extent
to which it is believed to be deserved.
There is evidence [Ref. 58] that the value of money dif-
fers with social class. The findings indicate that rank-
and-file workers are most concerned with extrinsic job
factors and that people at the higher occupational levels
are most concerned with intrinsic job factors. Another in-
teresting and important finding is that there is a consis-
tent increase in the importance of pay as level of social
class decreases. This is also true for job security, while
the importance of interesting work and freedom on the job
increased as social class increases. These relationships
may be explained by cognitive dissonance theory which indi-
cates that an individual in a lower level job, with limited
opportunities for autonomy and responsibility, may try to
minimize his psychological discomfort by indicating to him-
self and others that intrinsic job factors are not as impor-
tant as other job factors [Ref. 59]
.
Gellerman [Ref. 60] observes that money can motivate
only when the increment that is in prospect is large enough
relative to existing income. Most salary increase, bonus,
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and profit-sharing plans do not provide an increment that is
large enough to motivate any activity other than the purely
passive action of staying in the organization. He observes
further that these increases are usually not large enough to
motivate extra effort or creativity, or any other kind of
non-routine performance. That kind of motivation demands
increments of a considerably greater order of magnitude than
are usually available. As to the size of the increase
needed to motivate, Gellerman observes that it must make a
radical change in the individual's financial condition. It
must be a change in order of magnitude, making possible
things only dreamed of ordinarily and must change a person's
capital position. In short, the amount must be large enough
to change the individual's basic attitude toward money. As
his final caution concerning critical size, Gellerman states,
"Make no mistake about it—effective motivation with money
is no piker's game" [Ref. 61].
The studies cited thus far have given money mixed re-
views. It would appear that a number of factors must be
taken into account when considering money as a m.otivator.
As was previously indicated, money is mere important to rank-
and-file workers. For professional workers, salary was rated
twelfth out of 18 factors, indicating as predicted the lower
motivational potential as social class increases. And fi-
nally, there is the problem of critical amount that Geller-
man has pointed out.
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It would appear then, that money can be a motivator if
used in a proper setting. An analysis of the setting should
include a look at the intrinsic value of the work, the so-
cial class of the affected individuals, and the size of the
budget available for rewards. As was pointed out earlier,
a motivational strategy based on monetary incentives alone
does not contain the required flexibility to meet dynamic
situations, but money should be one of the options availa-
ble. The next consideration is the best method for using
money motivation. This leads to a discussion of m.erit pay.
3. MERIT PAY
Merit pay programs attempt to systematically tie pay
increases to specific measures of performance. They are
based on the law of effect, which states that behavior that
appears to lead to a positive consequence tends to be re-
peated. Merit pay has been advanced as the efficient way
to use money to motivate because the reward is linked to per-
formance through a system of performance measures, and these
measures are based on goals and objectives which are all
interconnected with the overall organizational goals and
objectives. In fact, the strong point to be made for merit
pay is that it replaces subjective with objective, quanti-
tative measures of performance. If a merit pay program is
to be successful, it must meet two basic requirements. It
is essential that a merit pay policy be built on a strong
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performance appraisal system, and that after the completion
of the appraisals, salary increases must be awarded as re-
wards for performance [Ref . 62]
.
In many instances the lack of clear communication within
an organization accounts for most of its personnel problems.
The prime success of merit pay programs is in their creation
of a clear understanding of the purpose of the work, and the
measures to be used in evaluating employee performance.
Piamonte [Ref. 63] observes that many a manager v/ould be
surprised at how little similarity exists between what he
considers the employee's job and how the employee sees it.
Just because the results expected may be clear to the mana-
ger does not mean that they are clear to the employee, and
no amount of motivation will move an employee in the desired
direction if the employee does not know where that direction
lies.
Because an efficient and effective appraisal system is a
primary requirement, many merit pay programs are closely
aligned with a process of management known as management by
objectives (MBO) . MBO was first applied by Peter Drucker
[Ref. 64] as an approach to planning. Drucker saw MBO as an
effective method for involving all levels of management in
participative planning through the integration of objectives
for their individual positions into, and supporting, the ob-
jectives of the organization as a whole. McGregor [Ref. 63]
favors MBO ' s value as a performance appraisal system, allowing
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employees and their supervisors to set performance objec-
tives for a period, setting a specific plan for goal achieve-
ment, and providing feedback via an appraisal at the end of
the period. He feels that this means of adding objectivity
to the appraisal system should remove the subjectivity and
ambiguity normally associated with an appraisal process.
MBO and merit pay systems are in wide use in the private
sector, particularly for management positions, commonly re-
ferred to as exempt positions (professional, administrative,
and technical) . As to the extent of use of MBO by industry,
a survey of the top 500 companies in the United States indi-
cated that 45 percent of the 403 who responded to the ques-
tionnaire stated that they had an MBO program. However, only
19 percent were rated as successful [Ref. 66]. Several rea-
sons for this lack of success will be discussed below, but
one potential problem with the MBO process in general should
be mentioned. Stimson [Ref. 67] cautions that meeting the
objectives may become an end in itself. He relates the ex-
perience of Sears Roebuck and Company and their development
of a compensation bonus plan for 900 managers. The plan em-
phasized volume gains rather than gross profit performance.
Managers interpreted this as a mandate to increase sales
even if it meant selling at a low profit margin. Sales
boomed, but quarter profits dropped by 36 percent.
Many of the failures of pay-for-performance programs
stem from problems of employees not being able to perceive a
45

direct relationship between pay and performance. Lawler
[Ref. 58], in discussing the common failures of merit pay
systems, cites the following areas as contributing to this
problem:
1. Poor performance measures. They must be objective,
comprehensive measures of performance; subjective
managerial judgment will not do and is viewed as in-
valid, unfair, and discriminatory. Without good ob-
jective measures, it is impossible to relate pay to
performance.
2. Poor communications. Salary and pay practices must be
brought into the open in clear, understandable language
3. Poor delivery systems. Complex procedures to adminis-
ter small changes in base salary are typical. A bonus
system might be better. By modifying the base salary,
as opposed to a bonus system, an employee can continue
to receive merit pay even if his performance has de-
clined for several years.
4. Poor managerial behavior. A reluctance on the part of
managers to make full use of the program by recommend-
ing small and large increases when they are deserved.
Managers are reluctant to give accurate ratings, par-
ticularly on the low side, because of the flack they
might catch.
He goes on to cite several of the obstacles that threaten
merit pay programs. They are:
1. Inflation. Cost-of-living increases are given across-
the-board and this fails to relate pay and performance,
distorting the intended clear relationship.
2. Organizational size. In large organizations many jobs
are not directly related to the bottom line which pre-
sents problems in determining clear performance goals
and measures.
3. Products and service organizations. It is difficult




4. New organizational structures. The wave of matrix
organizational structures makes it more difficult to
measure the performance of individual workers
.
5. Benefits growth. Compensation dollars that could be
spent on merit pay are spent instead on fringe bene-
fits, another weakening of the link between pay and
performance because the cash isn't available to reward
exceptional performance.
6. Performance appraisals. When objective measures are
not available workers are dissatisfied with perfor-
mance appraisal systems' inability to yield valid
measures.
7. Mistrust of large organizations. Mistrust of manage-
ment and mistrust of the rewards systems of our society
are on the rise.
Farmer [Ref. 69] makes several points concerning viable
merit pay systems. He echoes Lawler in calling for open com-
munication of compensation information. This allows each em-
ployee to know how his merit increase compares with increases
received by his peers. Job descriptions should be kept cur-
rent with a well publicized evaluation system, and he sees a
good performance appraisal system as a prime requirement. Ke
adds further that outstanding performers should receive sala-
ries that are 40 to 50 percent greater than the minimally
satisfactory employee and at least 20 percent higher than the
average employee. And finally, merit pay should be decoupled
from longevity to separate and reward current performance
.
Hamner [Ref. 70] makes a criticism of the use of merit
pay on the grounds that it utilizes externally mediated re-
wards rather than focusing on a system in which individuals
can be motivated by their jobs. That is, employees who enjoy
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their jobs, who are intrinsically motivated, will lose in-
terest when a merit pay plan is introduced because they re-
gard job satisfaction as their primary goal.
Hills [Ref. 71] sees several problems with the merit
pay concept. In a criticism similar to Hamner's, he argues
against pay-for-performance in general by stating that it
may be dysfunctional because high performers not only re-
ceive more pay, but also get the management development
opportunities. He adds that pay-for-performance on intrin-
sically rewarding work may actually decrease employee satis-
faction with the work, resulting in lower motivation and
performance. He makes several other constructive observa-
tions, adding his voice to the call for open communication
of pay raise information and an effective evaluation system.
Additionally he recognizes the problem of pay range limita-
tions, which place a pay "cap" which cannot be exceeded. A
manager may not want to give an outstanding performer an
increase which will take the employee to this "cap", and
leave the manager with no incentive to offer for next year.
A good employee, at the top of his range, places the system
in an awkward position if he is a high performer with no
chance for advancement in the organization at the present
time. Hills agrees with Lawler that a possible solution is
a bonus system rather than the modification of base pay. He
also recognizes the inflation problem and the tendency to
give across-the-board increases just to keep real wages under
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control, tending to dilute and muddy the clear relationship
of pay and performance. A possible solution to this problem
could be a separate time of the year for granting cost-of-
living increases and merit pay increases. And finally he
points to the problem of the size of the merit pay increase
and its ability to be a true motivator. Piamonte [Ref. 72]
cites the low value of merit increases as one of the primary
reasons that merit pay systems are seldom successful. He
offers the example of an employee earning $2000 per month
who is in effect told that if he works twice or three times
as hard, he will get a five percent increase, or $2100 per
month. The "stakes", after taxes, are nominal. There is
additional evidence echoing Gellerman's critical increase
size requirement and indicating that increases of 20 to 30
percent may be required to give significant motivation [Ref.
73] .
Hamner [Ref. 74] adds to the call for better communica-
tions, particularly with regard to employee performance,
citing research which has shown that the more frequently
formal and informal reviews of performance are held, and the
more the individual is told about the reasons for an in-
crease, the greater his preference for a merit increase sys-
tem, and the lower his preference for a seniority system.
On Lawler's point of poor management behavior, Hamner poses
a question to managers to test their effective use of merit
pay: Could I lay off managers based on their last merit pay
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increase—that is, if I had to reduce my managerial staff by
10 percent, could I identify these people by their last per-
formance appraisals and merit increases? He goes on to
advocate five criteria to make merit pay systems work:
1. Openness and trust should be stressed by the compensa-
tion manager.
2. Supervisors should be trained in rating and feedback
techniques.
3. Components of the annual pay increase should be
clearly and openly specified.
4. Each organization should custom tailor its pay plan to
the needs of the organization and individuals therein--
with participation a key factor in the merit pay plan
design.
5. Don't overlook other rewards.
Adams [Ref. 75] sums up the good aspects of merit pay pro-
grams and the accompanying appraisal systems by stating that
merit ratings indicate the degree of efficiency of employees
on specific jobs within a given classification; it appraises
the characteristics and performance of employees. It keeps
managers from passing superficial judgments on their em-
ployees. Forced to make objective ratings, they discover
strong points in a person they had overlooked previously.
He adds that employees probably work harder and strive for
improvement when they know someone is going to rate them and





Money has been shown to be a motivator of increased pro-
ductivity whose degree of success is a function of a number
of factors including social class, the intrinsic value of
the work, perceived equity, and the size of the monetary in-
centive. Merit pay has been shown, at least in theory, to
be a good device to link pay and performance if it is used
properly. However, a number of obstacles can hinder a suc-
cessful program. The primary obstacles are the lack of a
performance appraisal system with valid measures, and as
above, a monetary incentive of too small a size to elicit
more than passive response. There is evidence that the size
of the monetary incentive needed may have been overstated.
Stimson [Ref. 76] cites the work of Edwin Locke, a behav-
ioral psychologist at the University of Maryland, v;hich in-
dicates that the setting of goals is more conducive to goal
accomplishment than monetary incentives. Locke concluded
that when goals are set and accepted, the level of perfor-
mance is as high as when incentives are provided. Stimson
adds however, that other researchers take issue with Locke's
findings, contending that Locke dealt with small incentives
that had little potential to motivate, a return to the ori-
ginal problem. It is not clear at this point whether a
bonus system, to give lump sum awards, is more successful
than a system which modifies base salary.
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Several other pitfalls come to mind in considering merit
pay programs. The avoidance of difficult goals is a poten-
tial problem as is insurance that goals of equal challenge
will be selected across an organization. And although it
appears to be desirable, the total reliance on measurable
goals can exclude some subjective aspects of a job that are
important, but will go unevaluated. Finally, the emphasis
on individual performance may have a detrimental effect on
team efforts, causing friction when goal achievement re-
quires the services of the same common functional unit.
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V. A CRITIQUE OF THE FEDERAL MERIT PAY SYSTEM
A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
There are several factors that may lead to potential
problem areas in implementing a merit pay system in the
Federal government. The first thing that comes to mind when
thinking of the government is its size. It is the largest
single employer in the country. This large size could pre-
sent problems in program administration; largeness always
seems to add inertia, making the process cumbersome and
slow. The second thing which comes to mind is that the
government is bureaucratic in nature and exists to serve
the public. Viewed from the outside, it has no tangible
products, and in other than a few isolated instances, there
are no measurable outputs, aside from huge amounts of paper.
The primary function of the Department of Defense is na-
tional security, something which ties up large amounts of
assets, but is difficult to evaluate in quantitative terms.
Specific to the Navy, there are areas where units of measure
do exist, such as in shipyards, repair facilities, test and
evaluation units, etc., but in the majority of cases the
mission of an organization falls into the nebulous area of
national defense. This may present problems in determining
valid measures of perform.ance . Of course, many of the ci-
vilian positions are located in support functions, making
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the problem somewhat easier. Of these two factors, large
size is easiest to treat. The workforce can be partitioned
into smaller units, broken down by mission area, to make it
manageable. Each of these smaller units must then attempt
to determine valid measures of its mission performance; each
is then faced with the problems of product discrimination
and effective performance measures.
In implementing the Merit Pay System as required by the
Civil Service Reform Act, the Navy has relied on an MBO ap-
proach. As envisioned by the Navy, general guidance for
overall service goals is issued by the Secretary of the Navy,
and all subordinate organizations, down to the individual
level, attempt to dovetail their goals to this general
guidance, dependent on specific missions. The entire De-
partment is broken down into smaller units, each designated
as a Merit Pay Unit. Each unit can contain as many as
several hundred employees, or have less than twenty. Goal
setting takes place in June, and the performance period is
the following twelve months, ending with appraisals the fol-
lowing June. Incentive awards for this period are made in
October, a separation of three months between evaluation and
response. The amount of money associated with each rating
is determined by not only the number of employees in the
unit, but the relative grades and performance ratings of
each employee. Cash awards are available in addition to the
awards from the money pool.
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A great deal of time and effort was spent in training
managers and supervisors on how to establish, measure, and
evaluate goals and objectives. The Navy has followed the
advice of most of the authors presented thus far and has
open communications about the system and its interworkings
.
There is no secrecy about the method of merit increase de-
termination, so in these areas they receive high marks.
But, as mentioned above, the biggest obstacle to success
will be determining meaningful, measurable objectives in
light of the nature of the business. Hand-in-hand with this
are the problems of maintaining consistancy across a very
large organization to insure that objectives of equal dif-
ficulty are being selected, and guarding against organiza-
tional parochialism.
In addition to those mentioned above, there are specific
problem areas which are potential obstacles to a successful
program. One is the decrease in the motivation value of
money as social class increases. The Merit Pay System has
been implemented for managers and supervisors in the three
highest remaining grade levels of the general schedule.
These positions are far from the rank-and-file level where
money was found to have its highest motivational potential,
and since these positions are far above the national median
income level, there is serious doubt that money will have
any significant effect on productivity. As was mentioned
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earlier however, this may be a function of the size of the
incentive, which brings up the next potential obstacle.
The amount of money in the pool is limited, which con-
strains the size of individual awards. From the studies
cited, it is clear that if money is to have impact, it must
be of credible size, Locke's argument aside. Using a hypo-
thetical case of a 6.2 percent comparability increase, with
one-half or 3.1 percent being given as a minimum, a merit
increase of another 13.1 percent would have to be added to
the minimum if a 10 percent real increase is to be given,
making the total increase 16.2 percent. (This assumes that
the comparability increase v/ill keep pace with cost-of-
living, something that has not been the case in the past
several years.) In an article by Hunter and Silverman en-
titled "Merit Pay in the Federal Government" [Ref . 77] , the
authors supposed a comparability adjustment of 6.2 percent
and performed a sample comparison of the difference in pay
increases under the old and new systems for 11 employees of
a hypothetical agency. The end result was that employees
with outstanding ratings received less than five percent
more under merit pay, a level far below Gellerman's critical
level. Thus, there seems to be no advantage to the new sys-
tem if one assumes that the outstanding level employees
would have been in line for a Quality Step Increase any//ay.
A related problem is the separation of cost-of-living
and merit increases. Under the old system an individual
56

received the full comparability increase each year, and de-
pendent on length of service, could receive an additional
time-in-grade increase which had real, if small, impact on
his salary. Under the Merit Pay System, it is possible for
an individual who meets his performance objectives to remain
status quo or lose real income. There seems to be something
wrong with building a merit pay system in part with the
funds that were provided just to keep salaries even with the
private sector increases and inflation.
Both Hamner and Hills raised the possible problem of a
reduction in motivation if extrinsic rewards are offered on
jobs having high intrinsic value. A great majority of the
affected positions are in areas where self-esteem and self-
actualization are a large part of the job, offering the op-
portunity for this problem to arise.
Another drawback of the system is that it is aimed at
individual rather than group efforts, which may have a de-
structive effect on the social fabric of the organization.
Emphasis is shifted to individual effort at the expense of
the smooth-operating group. This increase in competition
could have an adverse affect on overall efficiency. Of
course, it is also possible that this increase in competi-
tion will lead to greater efficiency, but at the likely
cost of a decrease in good social climate.
On the bright side, the infusion of objectivity into the
appraisal system is sure to be welcomed. The process of
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goal setting, which forces the individual and his supervisor
to agree on the purpose of the position and on quantitative
measures of performance, are steps in the right direction,
even if the nature of the business makes it difficult to
find valid measures. Even the problem of low levels of in-
centive pay may not be an obstacle if Locke's findings are
valid.
B. SURVEY RESULTS
The Navy implemented the Merit Pay System (MPS) in June
of 1980 with the first rating period ending in June of 1931.
To determine the opinion of a sample of the affected em-
ployees (called MPS members) , a survey was conducted among
MPS employees at several Navy installations. The question-
naire shown in Appendix A was used to gather data from 241
MPS members. Responses were received from 128 GM-13's, 66
GM-14's, and 17 GM-15's. Two Senior Executive Service
supervisors of MPS members rated the supervisory section.
The questionnaire was designed to gather data at the indi-
vidual level in the following areas:
An assessment of the intrinsic value of the individual's
work.
The relevance of social and peer pressure en the
individual.
The degree of individual participation in goal setting.
The perceived linkage of pay and performance under MPS.
An assessment of the validity of the goals.
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An assessment of the motivational value of MPS.
The size of the pay increase needed to motivate out-
standing work.
In addition, the questionnaire attempted to measure several
factors from the supervisory point of view. These areas
were:
The degree of objectivity added to the appraisal pro-
cess by MPS.
The degree to which MPS has added to management
efficiency.
An assessment of the motivational value of MPS.
The questionnaire presented a number of statements and
asked respondents to check their level of agreement or dis-
agreement with the statements. The degree of agreement or
disagreement provided a subjective measure for analysis.
The first three statements discussed were an attempt at as-
sessing the intrinsic motivational value of the individual's
work, and the degree of the respondent's potential for self-
actualization, as measured by the individual's satisfaction
with their work. The three statements are shown below along
with the measurement scale and the percentage of responses
at each level along the scale.
Questionnaire statement: I find my current job challenging.
strongly agree strongly disagree
+ + + + +
45% 31% 15% 5% 3%
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Questionnaire statement: I find my current job interesting
strongly agree strongly disagree
+ + + + +
45% 34% 14% 4% 3%
Questionnaire statement: I find my current job satisfying.
strongly agree strongly disagree
+ + + + +
28% 35% 20% 13% 4%
The data appears to indicate that although a majority of the
respondents found their work both challenging and interest-
ing, there is a relative decrease in the number who found
their work satisfying. On the statement concerning job
satisfaction, there is a drop of almost twenty percent in
the strongly agree category, but the majority still agree
with the statement. This would seem to leave the door open
for the injection of some extrinsic motivators.
An attempt at measuring the degree to which the respon-
dents felt the need for social and group acceptance was made
with the following statement. Again, the percentage of re-
sponses along the measurement scale is shown.
Questionnaire statement: It is important to me that my fel-
low workers think that I am doing a good job.
ly agree strongly disagree
+ + + + +
45% 35% 14% 3% 3%
The need for group affiliation and social acceptance is in-
dicated by the high degree of agreement with this statement.
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This strong agreement indicates that any program should take
this need into consideration and not do anything that might
distort or destroy it.
The next two statements attempted to determine the de-
gree to which the respondents felt that they participated in
determining their own goals, and in determining the manner
in which the goals were achieved.
Questionnaire statement: I have freedom in determining my
own MPS goals.
strongly agree strongly disagree
+ + + + +
27% 34% 22% 10% 7%
Questionnaire statement: I have freedom in determining the
manner in which my goals are achieved.
strongly agree strongly disagree
+ + + + +
24% 44% 18% 11% 3%
The data indicates that there is a slightly higher degree of
participation in deciding how goals are to be achieved, than
in the actual determination of goals. This may be an indi-
cation of the problem of the difference in perception be-
tween the supervisor and the employee of the function and
requirements of a position. The important aspect of em-
ployee participation needed in a successful program is
evident.
The degree of feeling about the validity of the goals,
and whether they were realistic and meaningful for the
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position, was measured by the following statement. Addi-
tionally, it attempted to measure the degree to which the
employee felt that MPS added objectivity to the performance
measures.
Questionnaire statement: MPS has helped me by letting me
set realistic and meaningful goals for my position.
strongly agree strongly disagree
+ + + + +
1% 7% 22% 25% 45%
The majority of respondents disagreed with the statement,
and a near majority strongly disagree. This seems to indi-
cate that the MPS process has not helped the individual come
to an agreement with his supervisor on the goals and re-
quirements of his position. Several interesting pieces of
data come to light when comparing the responses to this
statement and the one dealing with freedom in determining
goals. Sixty-five percent of those agreeing that they have
freedom in determining their goals disagreed with the state-
ment that MPS helped them by letting them set realistic and
meaningful goals. Nineteen percent of those strongly agree-
ing that they have freedom in selecting their goals strongly
disagree with this statement. This seems to indicate that
either the selection of realistic and meaningful goals is
not particularly helpful or that the goals they had freedom
in selecting were not realistic and meaningful. A third
possibility is that they had been able to set realistic
goals prior to MPS and therefore MPS added nothing new.
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The responses to the next two statements attempted to
determine if the respondents felt that they performed better
under MPS and whether MPS had motivated improved performance





















The data shows a strong majority in disagreement with both
statements indicating that MPS has neither given the re-
spondents a personal feeling of better performance, nor has
it motivated them toward improved performance. The very low
percentage of agreement with these statements should raise
serious questions as to value of MPS as a motivational
device.
The degree of perceived linkage between pay and perfor-
mance was measured by the following statement.
Questionnaire statement: I feel there is a direct linkage
between pay and performance under MPS
.
strongly agree strongly disagree
+ + + + +
2% 5% 13% 22% 58%
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Again, there is a strong majority that disagrees with this
statement, indicating a failure of the system to produce the
perception of one of the primary requirements for a success-
ful program, the linkage of pay and performance. Without
this perception of linkage, the program cannot succeed.
The final question asked of all respondents had to do
with the amount of the pay increase they felt should be
awarded with a "substantially above target" rating, given
that a realistic set of goals for their position had been
determined. The data is summarized below, indicating the
percentage of responses at various levels of pay increase,
percent intervals common to the responses.
% pay increase 1-4 7.5 5 10 15 20 25
+ + + + + + +
response 6% 7% 22% 42% 13% 9% 1%
Thus, a near majority of respondents feel a 10 percent pay
increase is required to elicit outstanding work.
The final statements on the questionnaire were directed
at supervisors of MPS members. The first was an attempt to
determine whether the respondents felt that objectivity had
been added to the performance appraisal system by MPS. This
statement and the results are shown below.
Questionnaire statement: I find that MPS goal setting has
helped me to evaluate subordinate performance in a more ob-
jective manner.
strongly aaree strongly disagree
+ " + + + +
2% 14% 24% 28% 32%
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Thus, a majority disagree with the statement, indicating
that objectivity has not been added to the evaluation pro-
cess. This is a surprising result recalling that the MPS
is based on an M30 foundation.
The next statement attempted to evaluate whether the
supervisors thought that MPS has helped them manage their
subordinates more effectively, and indirectly, whether the
addition of objectivity was deemed helpful.
Questionnaire statement: I feel that MPS has helped me
manage my subordinates more effectively.
strongly agree strongly disagree
+ + + + +
2% 11% 20% 30% 37%
As can be seen, two-thirds of the respondents are in dis-
agreement with this statement. Apparently, the MPS process
has done little to aid supervisors in their relations with
their subordinates. The problem may be with the word "ef-
fectively" in the statement, which may connote something
different than the author's intent.
The final statement attempted to determine whether the
supervisors thought that MPS has had a positive effect on
subordinate performance.
Questionnaire statement: I think that the linkage of pay to
performance has had a positive effect on subordinate
performance.
strongly agree strongly disagree
+ + + + +
1% 8% 13% 19% 59%
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This indicates less than ten percent agreement while a
striking fifty-nine percent strongly disagree with the
statement. This again points to the failure of MPS to pro-
duce motivational results.
A number of comments concerning MPS were returned with
the survey forms. There were several comments about the
positive aspects of the goal setting process and improved
communications, but the majority of the responses called
attention to the failures of the program. It should be
pointed out at this time that subsequent to the June ap-
praisal period and prior to the payout in October, the
General Accounting Office ruled that the Navy payout formula
was not valid, and required additional work. Part of the
payout was delayed beyond the October date. This may have
had somie effect on the survey data, but the general flavor
would have undoubtedly remained the same.
A sample of the comments are shown below.
Awards are not based directly on meeting or exceeding
established goals between the supervisor and subordinate,
but are relative to the performance of other MPS members.
MPS is a failure. To tie cost-of-living to performance is
managerially stupid.
The time, frustration, and irritation associated with this
program are directly subtractive from my efforts to sup-
port the Navy.
The communications aspects of MPS are excellent.
The strong MPS emphasis on quantitative goals forces our
top level managers into stressing the less important goals,
since they are generally measurable. ... We find our-




The amount of time spent in paperwork for the results is
excessive
.
The general increases offered are not sufficiently large
enough to motivate a GM 13-15 to work harder or more pro-
ductively. Individual pride is a larger motivator.
Thus far about the only plus for MPS is the increased/ im-
proved communications with my supervisor.
Although (MPS) results in a more objective rating capa-
bility, it is not a motivator and is less efficient from
a viewpoint of the total time involved in the whole
process.
Good performance is not rewarded as it was under the old
system.
MPS has one good point. It forces me and my supervisor to
comjnunicate on a periodic basis.
The tremendous increase in paperwork is an impediment to
increased productivity.
Doing and completing a job in a highly satisfactory manner
is my motivation. Dollars can't buy that "sense of
accomplishment .
"
I work hard because I like to and it's my job to. MPS
isn't much of an incentive because there's no money in
MPS.
(The) trouble with MPS is that it reinforces an adversary
role rather than to further our common interests and goals.
A high performer usually sets high standards for himself
—
usually beyond his normal capability. This induces the
individual to continuously strive for excellence. How-
ever, under MPS, since a person's pay depends on his
achieving and exceeding his goals, he is encouraged to
lower his standards. Consequently, MPS encourages
mediocrity.
I lost approximately $1000 annual increase due to MPS rules
versus normal within-grade-increase . It may have been an
additional $1300 loss since I would have been a candidate
for a Quality Step Increase had I not been covered by MPS
.
My subordinates' and my own morale reached the lowest it




The Merit Pay System makes me want to be less of a "team
member" especially if you see that other members of the
team obtained higher ratings partly based on your coopera-
tion in meeting the department goal. I now feel less com-
pelled to contribute toward a common goal than I did prior
to MPS.
I find that in the first year there was no substantial
change in the performance of subordinate MPS members. I
am looking for a change in the second or third year.
The amount of money spent on training and the amount of
time involved in MPS can never be regained in value. The
amount of time spent on MPS and result of monetary gain to
the individual (average less than $200) is the greatest
factor in turning off individuals to the system. The MPS
system as applied to professional employees leaves a lot




This paper has reviewed several approaches to motivation
in the workplace. Particular interest has been paid to the
value of money as a motivator and its use as an incentive
reward. The linkage of performance to pay was presented in
the discussion of merit pay systems. The interest in this
method of linkage was in response to the requirement of the
Civil Service Reform Act for the implementation of the Merit
Pay System for a portion of the Federal workforce. It can
be inferred from this requirement that the authors of the
Act made a determination that money could be used to moti-
vate. This inference was supported by the literature given
certain conditions, but as was pointed out previously, the
existence of these conditions in the Federal sector is not
clearcut.
The use of monetary incentives in merit pay systems was
found to be an effective method of motivation given that a
number of conditions are met. In examining the work environ-
ment encountered by the civilian workforce of the Navy, it
was found that there were obstacles which had the potential
to reduce the effect of merit pay or render it not workable.
As survey data on the program the Navy implemented has shown,
MPS has indeed failed to produce the desired result of in-
creased productivity in the opinions of both employees and
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their supervisors. A number of reasons for this failure can
be cited.
Because of the pool concept, where a pool of money is
divided up among all members based on a number of shares
determined during the evaluation process, the dollar payout
for a specific performance rating can vary from year to
year. When a number of pay units are established to make
their size smaller and more manageable, the payout for the
same level of job input can vary considerably from unit to
unit, dependent on how the managers within the individual
units have structured their objectives and the degree of
difficulty in goal achievement within the unit. This vio-
lates two principles, that of pay equity and that of expec-
tation, i.e., expecting one reward and receiving another.
There are limits placed on the number of awards in each
category, forced by a requirement for a statistically normal
distribution of ratings. There are also limits placed on
the amount and number of cash awards. Each of these limits
places an artificial constraint on the system which in-
creases the mistrust of the members. They feel an arbitrary
decision can eliminate the year's worth of hard work they
may have contributed.
The cause and effect linkage so important to pay-for-
performance programs is not strong under MPS. The fact that
the rating period is one year long, after which at least
three months goes by before the first actual reward is
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reflected in an employee's paycheck is a weak point. The
appraisal and awards should have minimum separation in time
to be effective, and there should be a mechanism to reward
outstanding performance throughout the year.
The use of comparability money in the MPS pool is ques-
tionable. These funds should be left alone. Herzberg's
findings that money tends to be a dissatisfier when it fails
to appear is strongly reenforced here. This is coupled with
the fact that many employees have discovered that even
though they have performed their assignments in a completely
satisfactory manner, they have lost money relative to the
former system. It strikes many MPS members that it is
morally wrong to tamper with money meant to just keep them
even with the private sector. The strong resentment of the
loss of money under MPS is a cancer that can spread across
the entire system.
Something is basically wrong with the objective setting
process. Neither the em.ployees nor their supervisors see
the supposed addition of objectivity to the evaluation pro-
cess as helpful. Several comments allude to the use of ob-
jectives that are easily measurable, strictly for that
reason. Rather than being true goals of the position, the
whole system is being forced to accept goals that are mea-
surable and not necessarily meaningful or realistic. This
is in part a manifestation of the desire for multiple goals
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vice one or two that are truly reflective of the position
requirements
.
The bureaucratic nature of the government has made its
presence known in the vast amount of paperwork and time
spent in administration of a system that was intended to in-
crease productivity. Perhaps the pains of introducing a new
program can account for this, but for whatever cause, it
must be reduced.
Finally, the problem of the size of the monetary incen-
tive is raised again. MPS is at best a half-hearted attempt
at using money to motivate. The size of the stakes are not
even close to getting into the game. Indications from the
literature are for increases of at least 20 percent and the
majority of the survey respondents agree on a 10-15 percent
increase to motivate outstanding work.
To conclude, the conditions necessary for a successful
pay-for-performance program do not exist in the Federal en-
vironment. A combination of situation imposed constraints
coupled with the structure of the program as implemented has
resulted in the alienation of both supervisors and employees,
Money was intended to motivate, but the fact that satisfac-
tory employees have lost money vice the former system has
reduced the enthusiasm of both employees and supervisors.






Your grade Years of service Are you pay capped?
1, If you are an MPS member, answer the following:
strongly strongly
agree disagree
+ + + + +
I find my current job
challenging.
I find my current job
interesting.
I have freedom in determining my
own MPS goals.
I have freedom in determining the
manner in which my goals are
achieved.
It is important to me that my
fellow workers think that I am
doing a good job.
I find my current job satisfying.
MPS has helped me by letting me
set realistic and meaningful
goals for my position.
I feel I perform better under
MPS.
I feel that there is direct
linkage between performance and
pay under MPS.
I think MPS has motivated me to
improve my performance.
Given that you can determine a realistic set of goals for
your position, how much pay increase do you think should go
along with a "substantially above target" rating? %
Feel free to use the reverse side of this sheet for any com-








+ + + + +
I find that MPS goal setting has
helped me to evaluate subordinate
performance in a more objective
manner
.
I feel that MPS has helped me
manage my subordinates more
effectively.
I think that the linkage of pay
to performance has had a posi-
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